The spate of recent developments concerning the use and defence of ballistic missiles indicate that the Indo-Pacific regional security environment is fast deteriorating. In West Asia, the Houthi rebels have demonstrated the use of advanced military capabilities, including the launch of ballistic missiles. Their target zone has now expanded to include Israel. And in East Asia, China is seeking Russia’s assistance in deploying a missile attack early warning satellite constellation as its military enhances the tempo of military exercises and deployments around Taiwan and in the South China Sea.
These developments not only destabilise the general security situation in India’s neighbourhood but are also threatening its economic interests. Some of the global trade routes it is building, such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and the Eastern Maritime Corridor (Chennai-Vladivostok sea route), will be passing through these sensitive areas. Since the international legal regimes prohibiting missile technology proliferation are being dishonoured, India should invest in building a multi-layered space-based architecture for fast detection and response to the emerging threats.
Cold War: Proxy Wars and Proliferation
The Cold War is a framework of proxy wars between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union across the world. The Korean War, the Vietnam War and the Afghan theatre of conflict signify the practice of this strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.
The communist forces in the Korean Peninsula and in Vietnam were supported by the military equipment, training and advice of the Soviet Union. The air defence radars and anti-aircraft weapons delivered to these forces proved effective in shooting down the US combat and logistics aircraft deployed to support the nationalist forces. Some of this equipment is still being deployed by these countries.
For example, the S-125 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system delivered to Vietnam has been upgraded and remains in service. Similarly, North Korea is also known to be using a Soviet era SAM system, the S-200 (SA-5 Gammon), based on the missile parts recovered by South Korea in 2022. Similarly, some of the offensive air and land weapons delivered during the Cold War also remain in service. While Vietnam has been unified, the Korean War has only been temporarily halted in the absence of a formal peace agreement or unification.
As the Cold War strategic calculus is also underpinned by the nuclear weapons and their long-range delivery mechanisms, such protracted conflicts have evolved to absorb these advanced weapons as well. One such case is southern Asia, where three neighbouring, nuclear armed countries have warred over border disputes since the Cold War. In this case, China has not only supplied conventional weapons to Pakistan but also transferred components related to the M-11 short range ballistic missile (SRBM) in the 1990s. China was also willing to supply these missiles to Iran but ceased the transfer following the US objections. Nevertheless, it provided supporting equipment and training for Iranian missile development.
Increasing Lethality of Proxy Capabilities
Iran was desperate to improve its missile inventory following the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s when both parties used Scud tactical SRBMs on each other, including the population centers. However, neither the missile attacks nor conventional weapons assured a decisive victory for either country. The use of Scuds continued during the 1991 Gulf War when an attack on the US barracks in Saudi Arabia killed more than a hundred personnel. Consequently, the American Patriot missile defences were moved to Saudi Arabia, which continue to be fielded there.
This system continues to be active against Scuds by successfully intercepting them in 2015 and 2016. Unlike the earlier attacks, these Scuds were launched by the Houthis in Yemen, a rebellion largely supported by Iran with advanced military capabilities including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), cruise and ballistic missiles. This military support is evident from the mass of 430 ballistic missiles and 851 armed drones the Houthis were able to direct towards Saudi Arabia between 2015 and 2021.
Through this non-state actor, Iran was also able to expand its military reach and potentially strike targets in the wider maritime spaces and in Israel. One such Houthi attack using a mix of missiles and UAVs was intercepted last month by a US Navy destroyer in the Red Sea. A farther and more sophisticated ballistic missile attacks took place against Israeli targets but were intercepted by the Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 missile defence systems. These systems are designed to intercept long-range ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere, which proves the attack was launched by a well-trained force.
Failing Missile Tech Safeguards
Even though the ideological mindset of the two superpowers was at odds, the fear of mutually assured destruction (MAD) prevented them from engaging in a direct conflict. The US and the Soviet Union also led the drafting of several international treaties such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to block horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapon technology. The later treaties also incentivised placing limits on vertical proliferation (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties) and even reducing the stockpiles to a minimum level (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties).
The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) eliminated a class of weapons while the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was conceived to prevent the transfer of missile technology. More than 2,500 missiles are estimated to have been destroyed under the INF treaty. The MTCR continues to expand its reach with the inclusion of additional countries, including India in 2016.
But these international safeguards have failed in preventing the proliferation of high-end missile equipment and the attacks, considering the lack of immediate repercussions on the perpetrators. Moreover, states have the option of withdrawing from their international commitments to limiting proliferation. North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003 and restarted testing nuclear weapons and delivery mechanisms despite several UN security council resolutions prohibiting these activities. Consequently, building and advancing missile defence mechanisms, from sensors to interceptors, became vital to territorial security.
Compounding the regional security dilemma is the deteriorating strategic stability situation because of the foremost nuclear powers abrogating from the Cold War era treaties such as the INF and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that limited the number of interceptors to ensure the viability of the existing nuclear forces. The US and Russia accused each other of violating the provisions of these treaties as a reason for withdrawing from them.
However, these treaties were inadequate to deal with the emerging missile powers such as India, China, Israel, Iran, North Korea etc. In fact, one of the chief reasons cited by the US for withdrawing from the INF treaty is the lack of its restrictions over China, allowing it to build INF range missile systems in Asia. Moreover, China, Russia and the US are also currently engaged in hypersonic missile development, a technology posing negative implications for nuclear strategic stability.
Defence Space Agency: Need Investments in Hard Assets
All these facts and developments point to a fast deteriorating regional and global stability. This means the need for continuous monitoring, deployment and command and control is ever greater. India has shown its determination to invest in the hard assets required for territorial security and long-range deployment, including demonstrating its anti-satellite system. This also includes the radar stations in the Indian Ocean, military satellites, and forward deployment of the conventional and special forces. The nuclear and air and missile defence capabilities are also being strengthened. It is partnering with the Quad countries and other middle powers such as France to build maritime surveillance capabilities.
However, India is yet to unveil designs for a persistent and survivable space-based C4ISR architecture that can monitor the vast air and maritime spaces round the clock. Considering the adversarial neighbourhood, it is vital to detect movement and track missile launches instantly. The emerging network-centric warfare and stand-off employment of precision munitions also emphasise the need for such an architecture.
China, for example, is launching the early warning satellites to defend its high value military assets from attacks. It will then rely on its ISR satellites such as the Yaogan constellation to cue its retaliatory response. China will realise the network effects because of the reorganisation of its armed forces, which amalgamated its space, cyber and electronic forces under one service. This Strategic Support Force will be a force multiplier for other regular services as well as the rocket force that unified China’s missile forces. France and the US have also established their respective space command and space force.
However, India’s efforts towards establishing theatre and specialised military commands have not come to fruition yet. The reform of the Indian space programme has strengthened the civilian and commercial aspects but the defence needs are yet to be streamlined.
This situation should be rectified by the Defence Space Agency, which was given command over the military space activities. A requisite architecture covering the range of sensors, based on various mission requirements, along with the necessary redundancy should be planned. Redundancy in launch options should also be considered in its design. The private industry and the startups that possess experience in various domains must be co-opted to realise this mission, thus ensuring not only security guarantees but also economic benefits to the nation.
